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Summary: The main point of this paper is that foreign aid fails because the structure of 
its incentives resembles that of central planning. Aid is not only ineffective, it is argua-
bly counterproductive. Contrary to business firms that are paid by those they are sup-
posed to serve (customers), aid agencies are paid by tax payers of developed countries 
and not by those they serve. This inverse structure of incentives breaks the stream of 
pressure that exists on the commercial market. It also creates larger loopholes in the 
principle-agent relationship on each point along the chain of aid delivery. Both factors 
enhance corruption, moral hazard and negative selection. Instead of promoting develop-
ment, aid extends the life of bad institutions and those in power. Proposals to reform 
foreign aid – like aid privatization and aid conditionality – do not change the existing 
structure of the incentives in aid delivery, and their implementation may just slightly 
improve aid efficacy. Larger improvement is not possible. For that reason, foreign aid 
will continue to be a waste of resources, probably serving some objectives different to 
those that are usually mentioned, like recipient’s development, poverty reduction and 
pain relief.  
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Introduction  
 
Foreign aid has not existed throughout history as it is plasticized today, aside 
from a few sporadic events that may have resembled it. Countries in need looked 
to commercial credits rather than to have waited on aid. Foreign aid emerged as 
a part of the post WWII order, as one of the instruments to promote develop-
ment, relieve pain and alleviate poverty.
1 The emergence of aid on the interna-
tional scene is inseparable from the popularity of the heavy hand of state in the 
domestic economy of relevant states. When planning, regulation and social en-
gineering became the instruments in internal economic policies of larger devel-
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oped states, it was a natural step to implement the same tools on the international 
scene. Institutions for such programs were missing, since the WWII wiped out 
international organizational infrastructure that had existed before. The epidemic 
in designing international organizations after the WWII was motivated by creat-
ing international means for interventionist policies rather than by sheer re-
establishment of their rare pre-war equivalents. In addition to international de-
velopment agencies like the World Bank, IMF (International Monetary Fund)
2, 
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) or UNDP (United 
Nations Development Program), all larger countries established their own agen-
cies for implementation of development aid.  
It seemed easy to make the case for foreign development aid in the post-
war institutional environment. Developed countries could help non-developed 
countries largely at a negligent cost, it was stated
3, if they allocate a very small 
piece of their GDPs. By getting foreign aid, non-developed countries will proba-
bly not catch up, but at least they will avoid larger troubles and speed up their 
economic development.  
This idyllic picture of foreign aid prevailed during several decades after 
the WWII, and it started to pale just recently under the influence of articles and 
studies that called into question the nature, justification and efficacy of aid.  On 
the one hand, it took a long time to collect empirical evidence, and, on the other, 
it took some time to get the courage to attack something that was considered to 
be a sound part of the international order, which was not before seen as objec-
tionable. For eminent economists over the past several decades, foreign aid was 
not an interesting topic. Academic economics has ignored the subject because it 
seemed to be of a practical rather than of an academic interest. With rare excep-
tions, first class economists began to deal with foreign aid just recently when the 
shift in its understanding was already on the way. If any particular contribution 
to this shift is to be mentioned, it would be the work of the late Peter Bauer
4. 
While dealing with foreign aid for his entire life, he was the first to write sys-
tematically on the weaknesses of aid delivery. There is hardly a single argument 
questioning the rationale of foreign aid that was not mentioned by Lord Bauer. 
After Bauer, it is easier to see that foreign aid is ineffective because it resembles 
central planning. The contribution of this paper is not in declaring a similarity of 
aid to central planning, since we have seen such statements by Bauer, Easterly, 
Friedman or Lal. I will try to go further in two directions. First, I will compare 
the structure of incentives for market operations to those for aid and planning. 
My question is what are the incentives for aid workers to get things done. Sec-
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ond, I will suggest that foreign aid is not just inefficient – it is also counterpro-
ductive.  
Types of foreign aid may be very diverse, and I do not have all of them 
in mind when writing this paper. Excluded are the types of aid like those covered 
by a humanitarian intervention, diplomatic and political aid, the aid through 
trade and preferential agreements, and debt service write offs. My article is fo-
cused on foreign development aid in its narrow meaning where one constituency 
helps another by granting goods and services, financial transfers and technical 
assistance. The total amount of foreign aid was more than $ 2,3 trillion over the 
last five decades.
5 The size of the aid in the narrower sense in the world is esti-
mated to be $60bn per year at the beginning of XXI century. This amount is 
equal to some 20% of foreign direct investment in non-developed countries.  
Despite the fact that foreign aid accumulates significant means and that 
it has been practiced for decades, there is a growing attitude among researchers 
that the aid has no tangible, long-term impact on economic development. In 
conveying this result, some authors are more refrained (Swenson & Dollar; 
Easterly 2003) while others are very outspoken (Boone 1994; Lal 1996 and 
2005; White 1992; Martens et al. 2002; Easterly 2006, Djankov et al. 2006).  
Facts are the driving force in this change of attitude. William Easterly
6 
led a larger research using the data for 88 countries supported by the World 
Bank and found that in just six cases, aid had some positive visible influence on 
growth. More specific in its conclusion was the single largest donor – the U.S. – 
when it concluded the following, after reviewing its long history as a donor: 
“The U.S. has granted $ 144bn in inflation-adjusted dollars to 97 countries in the 
period 1980-2000. These 97 countries had a median inflation-adjusted per capita 
GDP of $1,076 in 1980 but only $ 994 in 2000, a decline in real terms”.
7 Among 
these 97 countries “…37 averaged zero or negative growth in per capita GDP 
from 1980 to 2000. Another 27 averaged marginal growth rates between 0 and 1 
percent over the span. And only 33 averaged growth in per capita GDP over 1 
percent from 1980. to 2000, of which only three (St. Kitts-Nevis, South Korea, 
and China) averaged over 5 percent”.
8 Djankov et al. go a step further and state 
that aid has a negative impact on recipients: “… foreign aid has a negative im-
pact on the democratic stance of developing countries, and on economic growth 
by reducing investment and increasing government corruption”.
9 All three re-
searches are based on large samples and all state that there is no long-term posi-
tive influence of foreign aid on growth and the standard of living. Under the 
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pressure of such results, the U.S. decided to reshuffle its aid programs in such a 
way that the aid inflows are related to reform efforts in the recipient country. 
This program is called Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The UN commis-
sion, chaired by Jeffrey Sachs, has developed the MDG (Millennium Develop-
ment Goals), a close relative to the MCA. I will comment the proposed changes 
at the end of this paper.  
 
1. Market vs. Planning  
 
The majority of studies on aid was focused on the effect of aid in the recipient 
countries. These studies have pointed out the lack of institutional infrastructure, 
different social habits and low level of development as the main obstacles to 
efficient aid delivery. Some among these studies sound reasonable and well 
grounded. It may be that these factors from the recipient side contribute to the 
inefficiency of foreign aid. Contrary to common wisdom, I will focus on the side 
opposite to recipients – on donors. I do so because it is irrelevant what happens 
at the recipient side if the instrument on the donors’ side is misconceived. If so, 
the responsibility for its ineffectiveness rests solely on donors and there is noth-
ing recipients can do to change the situation. We will also see that it is the nature 
of operation of aid that implies a particular structure of incentives that causes its 
inefficiency. In order to realize the former statement, let us compare the opera-
tion of the market, i.e. the business firm versus aid delivery.  
A business firm opening a branch office in a foreign country may face a 
different business and social environment, but its main objective remains the 
same throughout the landscape – making profit. The functional structure of a 
business firm is performs as usual; business people get revenues from those for 
whose goods they are supposed to produce. Microsoft serves customers around 
the globe and gets revenue in exchange for services. In doing so the firm needs 
to survive competition – to pass the test of the market. A firm’s headquarter 
continues to check the operation of its branch office in a foreign country in the 
same way in which it controls its domestic offices. Market pressure does not 
allow a business firm to relax its monitoring and controlling activities. Any re-
laxation of usual controls may result in loss of revenues and profits, and this 
would impose damage to a firm’s owners.  
Consider now the case of foreign aid. Its main objective is to provide 
development assistance to some foreign country. Voters from the country pro-
viding means for aid are not those that profit from aid. Donor’s voters may feel 
some moral satisfaction for offering aid to people in trouble, or enjoy some ex-
ternalities from a poor country’s development, but they are not the beneficiary of 
aid. Aid workers are not paid by those for whose benefit they are supposed to 
work. By serving some population aid agencies, contrary to business firm, get 
nothing but gratitude in exchange. They grant rather than sell. They serve the 
population of some troubled country, but they are paid by tax payers of devel-Why Foreign Aid Fails 
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oped countries – an inverse structure of compensation compared with that of the 
business firm.
10 By not being paid by and dependent on those served, aid work-
ers are relaxed from the operating pressures in the same way in which planners 
were relaxed from those “those who were subjects of the plans”.  
When one buys a Fiat, he does not need Audi, GM or any equivalent car. 
On the contrary, when one gets aid from the agency X, this does not exhaust the 
place for aid from the agencies Y, Z or W. In other words, market demand is 
limited by financial means available, while aid absorption capacity is not. More 
precisely, it may be limited only by a donor’s readiness to grant aid rather than 
by any trait of the recipient. Aid has a cost next to zero for the recipients, and 
they take it all.  
A business firm is very interested whether customers are satisfied, while 
aid workers do not have incentives to care whether aid recipients are satisfied. 
Aid workers need not care about recipients’ satisfaction because they are sure 
that recipients will always accept aid when it is offered, due to its low cost. Nei-
ther aid nor planning are exposed to competition, and this indicates that they are 
mutually similar as non-market phenomena. Like central planning, aid is cen-
trally collected and allocated according to the plan created in advance, regardless 
of circumstances in the recipient country and regardless of its effects. Plans for 
aid are tailored by one entity, while the costs are born by another. Planners and 
aid agencies are paid by governments (donors) rather than by customers. Conse-
quently, customer satisfaction (aid recipients) is irrelevant for the government 
(donor), and there is no need for proper feedback information. Instead, there is a 
feedback loophole that is also typical for central planning. Contrary to a business 
firm where feedback information is important because it informs producers on 
how products are accepted in the market, an equivalent feedback information in 
the case of aid is useless, since all aid is accepted due to its low cost rather than 
its quality. This completely frees the hands of those reporting on aid delivery.  
Having all that in mind, it is not surprising that foreign aid fell under 
doubt as an endemic trace of the past after collapse of communism. “Seventeen 
years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there is just one major area of the world in 
which central planning is still seen as a way to achieve prosperity – countries 
that receive foreign aid”.
11 Milton Friedman witnesses that central planning was 
deliberately introduced rather than organically emerged. “Again, conventional 
wisdom in the development community was that you needed central planning. If 
the underdeveloped countries were going to get anywhere, it would only be 
through central planning”.
12  
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Ineffectiveness of aid does not mean that all development aid operations 
must fail. Some aid operations were and are successful or partly successful. This 
means that they have achieved their objectives and improved the situation. How-
ever, this does not prove the case for foreign development aid, because success-
ful operations are not numerous. Under central planning some successful firms 
also existed due to different factors – like protection by the state, insufficient 
competition, limited supply of the good produced, etc. But they were just a small 
fraction of the economy and unable to reverse the fate of the whole order.  
Similar to central planning, the profile of aid delivery is complicated be-
cause it reflects the complex organizational structure and correspondingly cre-
ates a complicated, inefficient structure of incentives. A state, represented by 
politicians and bureaucrats, decides on behalf of its voters to grant aid to some 
foreign country. By doing so, the aiding country uses some specialized agency 
for aid delivery and the specialized agency eventually engages subcontractors 
for the execution of the aid program. Since the state with its agencies is not ex-
posed to the pressure of market forces, other mechanism of control is needed. In 
the standard scenario, politicians issue commands and they should control and 
monitor how commands are obeyed. The absence of market or other equivalent 
pressure, owing to the structure of incentives, allows weakening of the command 
and monitoring mechanisms that cause significantly different results of foreign 
aid when compared to foreign or domestic private investment. This distortion 
occurs along the chain of command from voters of the granting country to voters 
of a beneficiary country. Aid workers and agents in general are supposed to 
work in a certain way, although the structure of incentives allows quite another 
action. Aid workers, like planners, may have good intentions, but they are not 
really motivated to implement them. Even if they were personally motivated, 
they would face an inappropriate structure of incentives. Aid workers launch 
plans and raise expectations but do not bear responsibility (consequences). Like 
managers in state-owned firms, they do not bear responsibility for their choices 
because enforcement and monitoring cannot reverse incentives nor repair the 
damage. They engage in creating additional deception in order to present a rosier 
picture that everything goes well.  
Along the chain of aid delivery, there is an uneven, asymmetric relation-
ship of competence and information, again similar to central planning. As a rule, 
actors located lower in the chain (beginning with voters and politicians in the aid 
granting country and ends with local agencies, aid suppliers and voters in a re-
cipient country) are privy to significantly better information compared to actors 
located higher in the chain of aid delivery. While taxpayers and politicians in the 
aid granting country depend on second-hand information provided by media and 
their intermediaries, aid agencies, subcontractors and local agents have first-
hand information because of their day-to-day involvement in project implemen-
tation. Nevertheless, competencies in planning and decision-making concerning 
vital questions of aid are concentrated at the other end of the chain. They are Why Foreign Aid Fails 
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placed where the information is poor – in the hands of politicians of the aid 
granting country. All important questions – like the nature, size, type, objectives 
and duration of aid – are decided by politicians and aid agencies, i.e. those that 
are inferior in information compared to their subordinates along the chain. The 
same happened under central planning – planners were not interested in real 
circumstances and how those affected by planning feel and what they need. The 
above has at least two important consequences. First, decisions related to aid 
supply can not be optimal or adjusted to the situation. Second, there is no proper 
feedback information.  
In addition to these incentive and information problems with aid deliv-
ery, foreign aid in the world has undergone a change that enhances the space for 
manipulation. When the World Bank was established, its main objective was to 
promote investment, growth and development in poor countries. Socialism was 
popular in the East and in the Developing world, while in the West, the atmos-
phere was friendly to increasing government regulation, and welfare state poli-
cies. So many of the Bank’s activities moved around direct investment in poor 
countries in infrastructure, factories and farms. The results were much poorer 
than expected. Over the years, the Bank has redefined its main objective from 
promoting development to “fighting poverty” or “poverty reduction”. The shift 
occurred in 1980s with the focus on institutional reform rather than on invest-
ment. Other larger world donors have followed the Bank by redesigning their aid 
programs.
13  
The reasons for this fundamental change were twofold. First, growing 
awareness among donors that poor countries lacked a suitable business environ-
ment and that investment under present circumstances was equal to squandering 
resources. One may wonder how it was possible that aid and other authorities in 
developed countries were not aware of the problem before or shortly after the aid 
programs started and why they wasted resources for decades before discovering 
that such programs were failures.  Secondly, by shifting away from the prevail-
ing belief in planning to belief in market forces, investment activity of state and 
non-market funds was progressively considered non-productive. This redefini-
tion of the Bank’s role, followed by other larger aid agencies, clearly indicates 
the failure of the development philosophy from the early period. With the de-
mise of donors’ role in development, which was clear despite its basis on irra-
tional expectations, donors shifted to institutional reform. However, this is not 
only more difficult but also a much less clear task. Development was relatively 
easy to measure via conventional data. But how can one measure “institutional 
development” or “building institutional capacity”? This change of strategy to-
ward ever-increasing vaguer objectives is not original. Central planners did the 
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same. When one strategy collapsed, they proclaimed another fuzzier one, thus 
buying additional time at a lower cost.  
It is straightforward to realize that donor actions after the change of 
strategy were exposed more at will than before, what has again additionally 
freed the hands for manipulation of all actors along the aid granting chain. Post-
contractual uncertainties rose sharply, risks of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion became higher, corruption opportunities were enhanced, while monitoring 
and evaluation got new ground for “creativity”. “Creativity” consists in depict-
ing disasters as success stories. In a word, the whole game of granting aid be-
came less accountable than before.  
 
2. The Chain of Aid Delivery 
 
Voters and politicians. Similarly to central planning, the means for aid are first 
centralized and then disbursed. When politicians in aid granting countries, acting 
on behalf of their voters, decide to grant aid to some country, they both prima 
facie believe that this will improve the situation. There are a variety of reasons 
behind this conviction. One may feel that aid contributes to growth. Others may 
believe in improving the institutional structure of the recipient country. Many 
would like to relieve suffering among the population in a country. Taxpayers in 
developed countries, when confronted with pictures of the poor, may feel com-
passion, solidarity and prepared to help the poor. Additionally, aid suppliers and 
consultants would like to get new contracts and to earn additional money on 
external market. Finally, politicians may like to export values and home products 
by distributing aid. Whatever the reason, a decision to grant aid is hardly objec-
tionable. Readiness to help others is not just legitimate but even desirable. How-
ever, good intentions and desires do not necessary lead to good results. In order 
to make a nice generosity translate into a good result, one needs the appropriate 
instruments. This is precisely what is missing in the aid delivery chain because 
of the structure of incentives.  
Political room to maneuver with information on domestic transfers is 
relatively restricted since some voters are beneficiaries of transfers, while the 
rest of voters may at least sporadically monitor what is going on. There is no 
such feedback when it comes to foreign aid. Beneficiaries of transfers are for-
eign citizens. If it holds that politicians, above all, focus on their domestic inter-
ests, the interest for foreign aid may be merely instrumental, and if there is no 
opportunity to present the case for domestic purposes, foreign aid may be worth-
less for politicians. Politicians are controlled by their domestic terrain, those 
actions that they take on the behalf of voters, but this is largely much too diffi-
cult to account for in their actions abroad. Instead of pursuing voters’ prefer-
ences, politicians may deviate from expectations and advance their own inter-
ests. Politicians also may have some information about target country that is not 
available to voters and manipulate it against voters’ interests. Aid may be used Why Foreign Aid Fails 
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to simply shift attention from painful topics of internal policy toward foreign 
policy. Aid may be used as a pretext for a humanitarian or military intervention, 
to support or suppress some political forces, and that again may be different 
from voters’ preferences. Politicians may travel to a distant target country pre-
tending that they care about aid delivery. It is costly for voters to find out the 
truth about such trips that abound in corruption opportunities. In the end, aid 
may be used fairly to help those in need, but this depends more on the aid 
agency and not the politician.    
Politicians and aid agency. Contrary to private, for-profit firms that 
have only one objective – profit – aid agencies usually have multiple and hard-
to-define objectives. There are umbrella objectives and specific objectives and 
both are vague and multiple. Under umbrella objectives are to be found: pain 
relief, development promotion, combat poverty, building institutional capacity, 
strategic planning
14. Specific objectives range from supplying food, building 
hospitals and schools, graveling roads, preventing disease, supporting institu-
tional change (like privatization or legislation proliferation), supporting entre-
preneurship, enhancing education, etc. The structure, timing, priorities and ways 
to conduct such actions may be very different. Multiple objectives and different 
opportunities for aid delivery weaken both the connection of aid delivery with 
umbrella (political) objectives and the procedures of monitoring and evaluation 
of aid delivery. Unlike a business firm, it is difficult to establish an efficiency 
measure of the aid agency’s activities. Multiple objectives often operate against 
each other and weaken each other, so that aid may end up serving none of its 
multiple goals particularly well. An aid agency may obfuscate its objectives and 
manipulate results (performance) in order to avert investigation and prevent 
insight into real achievements. In order to cover multiple and frequently conflict-
ing objectives, administrations and aid agencies label these programs with slo-
gans like “aid, not trade”, “Beautiful Bulgaria”, “first things first”, “alleviate 
poverty”, “Serbia on the right path”. This merely focuses the public’s attention 
away from real problems and troubles in execution of aid programs.  
The wider the range of political principles and interest groups to which 
the politicians and aid agency have to respond, the vaguer will be the aid mis-
sion, the weaker the constraints and the more diversified and complicated the 
structure of incentives will be. International aid organizations, such as the 
UNDP, World Bank or EBRD, have an additional problem of reaching consen-
sus over objectives, due to their joint delegations.  These usually result in costly 
negotiations and mutual concessions that, as a rule, end with even weaker and 
fuzzier objectives than in the case of national donors. The control of interna-
tional programs is also weaker than in the case of national ones, again due to the 
joint delegation of responsibilities.  
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Aid agency, subcontractors and consultants. One may feel that there 
would be fewer problems as the implementation goes down the chain, from poli-
ticians via aid agency to subcontractors. This expectation is unfounded since the 
problems continue to persist. “Following Gresham’s law, ‘bad suppliers will 
drive out good suppliers’. On average, suppliers who take more risks and make 
less effort to achieve project objectives, stand a higher risk of being found out. 
But that risk becomes verifiable ex post of contract signature only and often ex 
post of project implementation, when it is too late and/or very costly to correct 
implementation problems. There are basically two ways to reduce these post-
contractual risks: to invest more in ex ante information on the quality of the bid-
ders or make it exceedingly costly for them to take implementation risks”.
15 
However, both hopes for improvement fade away as one takes a closer look. In 
order to get better suppliers, additional research is needed. The more one invests 
in additional research of this type, the more accurate information he will receive. 
It also holds, the more investigation conducted on aid delivery, the more interest 
subcontractors will have to invest in order to distort the information, by present-
ing themselves and their works in a better light than they de facto are. Negative 
selection sometimes makes additional research pointless. Frequently one gets 
just two or more bidders that are good or bad to a similar degree. Their only 
interest is to get the job and to acquire profit, this time in exchange for nothing, 
since aid agency is short of incentives to check how subcontractors operate. 
Even if it appears to be an honest bidder, the reality is that there is nothing like 
this because such a bidder has already been expelled from the business as a dis-
ruptive factor that has a higher operation costs and lower profit. This would 
merely unsettle the aid agency because it raises the risk of honest reporting, 
which again may shed undesirable light on the whole aid operation, i.e. on its 
ineffectiveness.  
Another option for an aid agency would be to improve performance 
evaluation. This may include several different measures like reducing implemen-
tation uncertainties and implementation risk, close monitoring and reliance on a 
really independent evaluation. This is going to be not only exceedingly costly 
but also undesirable, as I will show later on by discussing the evaluation risks.  
It is sometimes said that aid officials quickly rotate out which minimizes 
the effects of the learning-by-doing process. Such fast rotation may play some 
role in explaining aid results but just to some modest degree. The salary policy 
offers a much better starting point for the performance explanation. Salaries in 
aid agencies are fixed because it is impossible to measure aid performance. They 
are fixed extra high because such salaries are considered to be a “hardship al-
lowance”
16, although in reality there is nothing hard or dangerous. As a rule, 
                                                 
15 Martens, 165.  
16 I met in Belgrade in 2002 an official of one larger international development organization, aged 
29. His mission was to visit Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo. He was simultaniously 
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salaries in aid agencies are much higher than that of the staff in local administra-
tions, where they are fixed as well. This means that international aid agencies 
would be able to save a lot of money spent on salaries, but they are not interested 
in such a saving strategy. This again indicates that salaries are present rather 
than compensation for work effort. Fixed salaries do not encourage risk taking 
and work ethics. When pay is not related to performance indicators, it is impos-
sible to improve incentives for a better performance by shifting salaries up and 
down. Local bureaucrats may be additionally discouraged to facilitate execution 
of aid programs having seen that aid officials are paid several times higher
17 than 
they are for a work that local officials consider as a useless squander of money 
by careless, arrogant, ignorant and sometimes even insolent persons. Nothing 
would change if aid workers were ordinary people with exception of disappear-
ance of non-necessary irritation. Aid workers are short of motives for work ef-
fort and of instruments to induce local authorities and other stakeholders to assist 
aid programs, with exception of those domestics that are net beneficiaries of aid, 
and these are rare. Central planning was inefficient in enforcement although it 
disposed over heavy instruments to discipline subordinates like the communist 
party, regular and secret police. Constitutionally constrained government grant-
ing aid is short of such instruments. By lowering the price for offenses, the threat 
of sanctions is undermined. News about the criminal prosecutions of politicians 
and aid workers for the misuse of aid funds is so rare that it deserves to enter the 
headlines.  
Target country, local agencies and target groups. Among the justifi-
cations for foreign aid, the “vicious cycle of poverty” or “poverty trap” are the 
most popular and have been championed for a long time.
18 Poor countries are 
poor because they cannot generate capital. Consequently, they cannot develop, 
thus keeping them poor. The current trend of thinking to believe that only way to 
eliminate this poverty is to bring capital from the outside. If one assumes that 
this is so, how can be explained that once poor countries, which are now devel-
oped, have ever developed? The main problem is not whether some country is 
poor or developed; the question is does it have the institutions that encourage 
capital formation, investment and entrepreneurship. The problem of the African 
countries is not that they are poor or that they do not get aid enough. Their prob-
lem is that they rely on socialism rather than capitalism, and with foreign aid 
they receive more socialism. Lord Bauer and many others wonder why govern-
                                                                                                                          
exceeding five times the accommodation costs. For 28 days of his „mission“ he collected $ 
146,000 and all that was tax free. It was against the rules of that organization to get more than one 
honorarium of $ 1500 per day.  
17 Sometimes salary differentials are offending. The chief of one international program for South 
Serbia 2001-2005 had a monthly salary 52 times higher than the Serbian average. His deputy 
(local staff) had 24 times higher salary than average, local activists 10-12, drivers 6 times, coffee 
girl 5 times – the lowest salary in the local office.  
18 Although this justification has been discredited for a long time, Sachs (2005) and the UN MDG-
program are based on it.  Miroslav Prokopijević 
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ments pursuing anti-market policies that economically cripple their countries get 
aid. The above explains the paradox. Aid based planning comes in support of its 
domestic ally, resulting in a stagnating or deteriorating situation. For that reason, 
aid agencies cannot indicate any improvement over decades, as the World Bank 
cited in reports in footnote no. 32. The solution for poor countries is to rid them-
selves of foreign aid and to enforce property rights, freedom of contract and 
open their markets.
19 
Another prejudice is the myth that aid is a win-win strategy. Donor 
country or agency asks a recipient to do something what is in the recipient’s 
interest in exchange for getting aid. It seems that recipient profits twice. It profits 
once by doing something that is in its’ interest, the other time by getting aid. 
This win-win strategy seems to be predestined to succeed.  
This requires shedding more light onto the idyllic win-win strategy. Let 
us go back to the beginning and ask: who decides what is in recipient’s interest? 
This is usually done by donors in a similar way in which central planners oper-
ated. They estimate what is supposed to be in the recipient’s interest. Donors 
select what is in recipient’s interest, although they do not bear the consequences 
of their choice. Planners also decide on others’ fates without being affected by 
the consequences themselves. The cost for central planning is borne by state 
budgets or foreign creditors; the cost for aid is borne by the taxpayers of rich 
countries and the recipient. No wonder the recipient, when struck with such an 
uneven structure, is frequently either indifferent or against such imposed choice. 
Recipient may reject donor’s choice even when it is a reasonable one. Rejection 
may be caused by a different perception of priorities and different interests. It 
may reject objectives and accept aid. It may accept both the objectives and aid, 
which again does not guarantee a successful implementation of the aid program.  
All Central and East European countries (CEECs) after the collapse of 
communism were populated by the same density of foreign aid workers deliver-
ing technical assistance. All of these countries suffered from the same disease. In 
every case, the advice was the same – do some kind of pro-market reform. Due 
to the fact that CEECs’ situations were similar, one would conclude that the 
post-reform outcome should be similar, too. This would be wrong. Although the 
situation and density of experts were similar, the outcomes were widely diver-
gent. Some countries did fast, deep and consistent reforms and became reform 
champions. Others have seen moderate reforms, and the third ones were the 
latecomers. The conclusion is straightforward – foreign expertise has no greater 
positive impact on reform in CEECs. The reform exclusively depends on the 
domestic political elite and given circumstances. Only insiders may be a factor 
of reform. Not only has foreign technical aid not contributed to reforms in the 
CEECs latecomers, it may have actually slowed down reforms in reform cham-
pion CEECs by suggesting welfare measures, bureaucratic interference into 
                                                 
19 As Mart Laar succinctly said citing Peter Bauer – “Trade, not aid”.  Why Foreign Aid Fails 
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economy, slow pace liberalization, and control instead of competition.
20 For 
example, all candidates for the European Union from the CEE were urged by the 
European experts to raise their income and corporate profit taxes in order to 
finance the welfare measures comparable to those in over-regulated EU15. In-
stead of home-grown regulation and central planning, a similar imported process 
developed under umbrella of “technical assistance”.
21 Instead of getting rid of 
the socialist past, technical and other aid slowed down the change of the rules of 
the game and in some countries, even repaired and fixed the already shaken so-
cialist heritage. As in the case of Africa, technical and other aid in the CEECs 
restored socialism
22 or slowed down its demise
23, rather than acting as an impe-
tus to capitalism.  
The above explains the paradox that the CEECs championing in reforms 
(Baltics, Czech Republic, Hungary) have received rather symbolic financial aid, 
while those that were latecomers (Balkans, Ukraine) obtained large financial 
transfers. Larger transfers discourage reforms. Transfers have temporarily im-
proved the standard of living and macro-economic stability, but they failed to 
inspire institutional change. Aid raises moral hazard both by reducing readiness 
for reform and by undermining incentives to invest. Aid reduces readiness for 
reform because it spreads the message that improvement is possible without 
reform (due to aid) and foreigners, rather than domestic actors, will improve the 
situation. By getting a significant amount of foreign aid the recipients, believe 
that future troubles and poverty will induce future aid.
24 In addition, foreign aid 
makes government stronger, and in many underdeveloped countries, government 
was already too strong or even dictatorial.  
One of the popular trends in aid delivery is to blame the recipient for the 
failure of aid. Recipients are blamed for being lazy, inactive, disinterested, cor-
rupt, and without appropriate institutions or understanding of the aid objectives. 
It is not a secret that this description frequently fits into the situation. Taking a 
different approach, donors are the one who actually have insight into the situa-
tion of the target country even before they have decided whether or not to go 
there. If they have not provided enough information, that is their failure rather 
than that of the recipient. This picture, where only recipients are blamed for the 
failure of aid missions, existed merely because the world press shared the pre-
vailing view that donors are good and that only recipients may be at fault. In 
fact, all important decisions and instruments are in the hand of donors. Over 
time, the verdict of blame for aid failure shifted away from “blame the recipient” 
                                                 
20 Deepak Lal 2005. 
21 To be fair, current technical assistance resembles more to central over-regulation than to plan-
ning; just a smaller fraction of technical experts still believes in planning.  
22 Examples are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.  
23 Examples are in Poland, Romania and Slovenia.  
24 Let us put aside the standard objection that aid finances consumption rather than investment, 
since the investment conducted by state and non-market funds is notoriously inefficient.  Miroslav Prokopijević 
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to a “blame both sides”. It seems that another lapse of time is needed in order to 
get courage to locate the main responsibility on donors.   
Aid to corrupt regimes is also as problematic as aid to governments con-
ducting anti-market policies. Its size and frequency show that this does not hap-
pen by chance. “The world’s 25 most undemocratic government rulers (out of 
199 countries the World Bank rated on democracy) got a sum of $ 9bn in foreign 
aid in 2002. Similarly, the world’s 25 most corrupt countries got $ 9,4bn in 
2002. The top 15 recipients of foreign aid in 2002, who each got a more than a 
billion dollars each, have a median ranking in the worst fourth of all govern-
ments everywhere (ranked in democracy, corruption, etc.)”.
25 It is impossible 
that donors are not aware of where their means end. One option would be that 
they eventually deliberately work with corrupt regimes because this enhances 
corruption opportunities inside the aiding agency. Another option would be that 
these 25 regimes are among the poorest and that bureaucrats do not care that 
they are extremely corrupt, too. Experts calculated “that between $26bn and 
$130bn of money lent by the World Bank for development projects since 1946 
has been misused”.
26 Such a massive misuse of funds cannot coincidentally hap-
pen. Even more surprising is that aid agencies have rules stimulating corruption 
and manipulation. Like the UNDP and WB, rules prevent staff in nearly all aid 
agencies for testifying in public, including public hearings. This is a blatant con-
tradiction of the aid agencies’ demands on poor countries to operate transpar-
ently.    
By knowing that monitoring is not precise and tight and that evaluation 
will be friendly, donor organizations do not need to hesitate to spend resources 
without a careful analysis of the situation and selection of methods and targets. 
Once they enter some country, they may like to pursue their own
27 instead of a 
recipient’s interests. But whatever they do, they became a hostage of the situa-
tion. Choice is reduced. If they eventually decide to leave a country, this will be 
booked not just as a donor’s failure but as a failure of all persons involved in aid 
delivery, damaging their careers. For that reason, an exit option is merely re-
served for situations where it is obvious that there are some huge and visible 
obstacles to the continuation of aid delivery. In fact, situations where aid deliv-
ery is questionable, if not ineffective, are much more numerous that these clear 
situations with obstacles. In such situations donors continue with aid, since this 
option is perceived as less troublesome. The explanation for this is simple. So-
cial or political embarrassment is delayed, if not averted, and there is a chance to 
influence and bias the report.    
                                                 
25 Easterly 2006, 18.  
26 Cf. Carol 2004. The estimate is in 2004 dollars.  
27 When the World Bank decides to pay out adjustment loans, despite the fact that in one third of 
cases countries fail to implement policy targets, it happens because the Bank worries about the 
country’s ability to service previous Bank or other loans. Debtors hardly may fail to notice aid 
supplier’s lack of commitment to its own commitment. Cf. Dollar & Svensson 1998. Why Foreign Aid Fails 
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By being similar to central planning according to the structure of incen-
tives foreign aid is also similar to planning in achieving poor results. Central 
planning, as experience shows, has never ended poverty. It was implemented at 
home while foreign aid programs are implemented abroad. This distance just 
deepens the failure. By anticipating that aid design and aid results widely di-
verge, all intermediaries along the chain have incentive to keep the information 
on low profile and even to bias it according to the need. No wonder that the aid 
performance and reactions of beneficiaries sometimes are manipulated to such a 
degree that they are beyond the recognition.  
 
3. Monitoring and Evaluation of Foreign Aid 
 
Because central planning was ineffective, evaluation and reporting were ex-
tremely sensitive and important. Their main task was to manipulate results heav-
ily, so disasters were depicted as success stories. Eventual negative reports on 
planning were highly undesirable or even prohibited. Central planners never 
conceded that their five-year-plans had failed. They used a totalitarian state that 
provided coercive means to spread lies and capture information. By the same 
token, foreign aid continues the practice of mass deception through reporting 
and evaluation. However, it is much more difficult to mimic the manipulative 
habits of central planning in a constitutionally constrained democracy.
28  Despite 
the fact that aid agencies are exempt from domestic rules and that their inspec-
tion and investigation is restricted in different ways, their results are publicly 
visible, and as such, a legitimate target of research.  
An inverse structure of incentives in conjunction with political and geo-
graphical separation between taxpayers and beneficiaries make it difficult to 
monitor and evaluate aid performance feedback process. A broken feedback loop 
enhances the space for manipulation.  
Donors or taxpayers judge the work of an aid agency exclusively by its 
public image and public pronouncements. Politicians control aid agency by re-
ports that are written either by agency officials or by independent consultants. In 
many organizations, the task of evaluation is conducted by persons directly in-
volved in projects, like officials of the aid agency itself, so that they can not be 
considered impartial.
29 It is clear that insiders cannot be relaxed from their val-
ues, objectives and interests. They may have enough information, while being 
                                                 
28 Researchers that do not share optimistic view on aid face similar obstacles to dissidents under 
communism. Officials and aid agencies make for them difficult to get the information, declare 
them not eligible for grants and rents, discourage publication of their works, react with silence to 
criticism. Nevertheless, authorities cannot stop, imprison or kill unorthodox researchers, as it 
happened to dissidents.  
29 The advisory commission, set up by the U.S. Congress and chaired by Alan Meltzer, recom-
mended, among other things, that the aid agencies like the World Bank undergo an independent 
evaluation. Despite this, independent evaluation in the WB did not took place yet.  Miroslav Prokopijević 
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insiders, but they have an interest to reduce or to intentionally neglect negative 
information and to overstate positive information. They will tend to produce 
reports favorable to their past dealings in order to justify their activities and to 
enhance prospects for their future careers.  
But even in those cases where evaluation is conducted by some third 
party, there are severe problems. Imprecise, ‘woolly’ and basically useless re-
ports emerge for several reasons. First, when a firm/organization gets an evalua-
tion contract it is short of incentives to search for more detailed information. The 
search is costly and any further search is financially consuming while the re-
ward/revenue is already fixed by the contract. Secondly, a firm operating at the 
limited evaluation market should not upset the market with a truth-telling report, 
thereby loosing its foot in that market in the future. Having seen at least ten 
dozen of evaluation reports during past fifteen years, I was surprised by how 
they all look similar
30 to each other, even though they were written by different 
organizations and authors. Based on experience, one can say that the ideal 
evaluation report has the following main features:  
1.  The report should repeatedly point out that the aid program has 
achieved its starting objectives and frequently that this is done be-
yond the initial expectations.  
2.  The report is based on the evaluation of inputs rather than outputs. 
This makes it possible to concentrate on good intentions and means 
used rather than on the efficiency of resource utilization.  
3.  Statements in the evaluation report are broad and general enough, 
while precise and accurate information is avoided.  
4.  Wording, statements and the general spirit of the report should not 
disturb any interest group or particular important person. A violation 
of this rule may result in additional investigation inspired by such a 
group or person.  
5.  Heavy criticism of the project execution is to be avoided at any 
price. The modest, tempered and general criticism may be welcome, 
especially if it is related to broad or peripheral topics.  
                                                 
30 It seems that this type of similarity appears more frequently, as a result of similar structure of 
incentives: “I was working with a few colleagues and consultants on the two global performance 
reports of the EC- financed Phare and Tacis… We have worked our way through a pile of monitor-
ing and evaluation reports on individual Phare and Tacis projects… While we were compiling a 
synthesis report, we were struck by the convergence of views that emerged out of this apparently 
chaotic pile of information. There were many similarities in project design, implementation and 
outcomes, in behavior of project managers and policy decisions, despite a wide diversity of project 
circumstances, across countries, sectors and types of projects. Evaluation reports on EC pro-
grammes in other regions of the world revealed similar patterns”. Martens et alii 2002, p. 2-3. 
Emphasize is mine. Not to forget that Martens and others acted as the EU super-evaluators and that 
they were obliged to be as polite as possible in order to avoid that their report inspires a larger 
embarrassment.  Why Foreign Aid Fails 
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6.  Humor, irony and cynicism are to be avoided. A sterile bureaucratic 
language with the pro-active formulations, as well as politically cor-
rect language is strongly encouraged.  
One cannot say that the writers of evaluation reports are born con-artists 
or illusionists, but they become like that by realizing circumstances and incen-
tives of the evaluation process. Evaluation is highly decentralized and so reports 
cannot be coordinated to look similar to each other. If they, nevertheless, look 
similar, it must be the result of similar constraints. False or ‘woolly’ reports are 
celebrated as a good product in a sensitive environment of mass deception
31 
through evaluation concerning foreign aid. Similar to aid reports, planning re-
ports indicated very good results, but they had nothing to do with reality. Re-
ports suggested that plans were implemented satisfactorily, while the economies 
were in ruins. Some members of interest groups (like party and state officials or 
managers) got rich, while citizens remained in poverty – nothing different than 
foreign aid.  
There will be no solution to allocate a larger evaluation budget and try to 
produce relatively more accurate reports on projects since the structure of incen-
tives will remain the same and the new product would be not much different 
from the current outputs. Even when a grosser misuse of aid is found, as a rule 
there need not be an appropriate reaction.  
Despite all indications that aid fails, a dominant position in aid granting 
countries and aid agencies is that the aid is helpful to recipient countries. This 
conviction is based on prejudices, wishful thinking or biased evaluation. Evi-
dences show that foreign aid has no tangible impact on the long-term economic 
growth and improvement of conditions in target countries. This is in accord with 
a broader conviction that central planning that never ended poverty. The task of 
evaluation is to hide failure and damage by reporting some degree of success; 
                                                 
31 Aid agencies repeat the same promises over decades that better times will come soon and they 
never come. Easterly (2003, p. 35-36) has collected such anthological quotes from the World Bank 
reports related to Bank spending in Africa over more than twenty years: “From a 1981 World 
Bank report, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (p. 3): ‘Policy action and foreign 
assistance … will surely work together to built a continent that shows real gains in both develop-
ment and income in the near future’. From a 1984 World Bank report, Toward Sustained Devel-
opment in Sub-Saharan Africa (p. 2): ‘This optimism can be justified by recent experience in 
Africa … some countries are introducing policy and institutional reforms’. From a World Bank 
report, Financing Growth with Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa (p. 15): ‘Progress is clearly 
under way. Especially in the past two years, more countries have started to act, and the changes 
they are making go deeper than before’. From a 1989 World Bank report, Sub-Saharan Africa: 
From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (p. 35): ‘Since the mid-1980s Africa has seen important 
changes in policies and in economic performance’. From a 1994 World Bank report, Adjustment in 
Africa (p. 3): ‘African countries have made great strides in improving policies and restoring 
growth’. From a World Bank report, Can Africa Claim the 21
st Century?: ‘Since the mid-1990s, 
there have been signs that better economic management has started to pay off’. From a 2002 
World Bank press release on African Development Indicators: ‘Africa’s leaders … have recog-
nized the need to improve their policies, spelled out in the New Partnership for African Develop-
ment (NEPAD).”  Miroslav Prokopijević 
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therefore, the evaluation process is irreparable. Deliberately spreading delusions 
is damaging because it distorts perception and prevents proper action. Prospects 
for getting more accurate reports are murky and this is sometimes confessed 
even by official super-evaluators of the largest aid donors: “Pessimism prevails 
to the ability of evaluation to improve transparency and accountability towards 
taxpayers, or even to enhance aid program performance in general; evaluation 
itself is subject to political manipulation”.
32 Changes external to aid delivery, 
like more intensive lobby group activities, public awareness campaigns and 
similar actions may slightly improve the aid performance evaluation, but they 
can not reshape the structure of incentives.  
 
4. Can Foreign Aid Be Significantly Improved? 
 
If foreign aid is highly ineffective, can its failure be recovered in order to get 
better results? Some modest improvement is possible. If reasonable politicians 
rather than senseless technocrats would be in charge of aid programs; if sensitive 
and educated aid workers would be recruited rather than ruthless, undereducated 
and biased individuals; if moral hazard, corruption and adverse selection would 
be reduced by closer monitoring; if more realistic reports would be produced 
through further investigations of this process; and if the evaluation agency would 
be co-responsible for the fate of the program- then foreign aid may be improved 
to some moderate degree.  However, it can neither be effective nor comparable 
to private investment. The same may be said about central planning.  Its failure 
may be moderated and postponed by implementing suggestions similar to those 
mentioned above. But that is utopian since it would require the change of human 
nature. In the present world, the largest hurdle to improve foreign aid or central 
planning is represented in the structure of incentives.
33 It is settled in such a way 
that aid cannot be reshaped to look similar to the operation of a profit firm, i.e. it 
prevents the introduction of more effective means for functioning, monitoring 
and evaluation. Due to its structure of incentives, foreign aid is ineffective be-
cause of its nature rather than because of some particular other mechanism. 
While being similar to central planning, foreign aid is irrecoverable. Central 
planning was always on the move, but never truly reformed. After its collapse in 
the Central and East Europe and elsewhere in the late 1980s, the system was 
abandoned and replaced with some type of market order.  
                                                 
32 Martens, 176.  
33 Easterly (2003, 2006) is inconsistent on the main point. On the one side he believes that aid is 
similar to central planning and that “the right plan is to have no plan”. On the other side he be-
lieves that reform of aid is possible if grand plans are abandoned and replaced with careful social 
engineering on the small scale. He neglects that small scale planning is still planning. It seems that 
he is not able to get rid of planning and aid after serving 16 years in the WB aid projects.  Why Foreign Aid Fails 
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Although this is the case, there are some optimists who would like to 
revolutionize foreign aid in order to make it efficient. One type of optimists re-
lies on aid privatization, another on conditional aid.  
Concerning privatization, let us ignore for now the fact that foreign aid 
is nationalized. Even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that foreign aid is 
private, this will not significantly change the efficacy of aid. There will probably 
be some slight improvement along the chain of command, as it was suggested 
before, but the structure of incentives will remain the same. In the case of aid, 
the market cannot exercise pressure like in some commercial activity. In the best 
case, some competition may exist among private donors to help recipients in 
need, but privatization is not needed in order to see competition.
34 However, 
competition among donors does not necessarily improve the quality of aid deliv-
ery, since the demand for aid, due to its low cost, is endless rather than limited. 
It merely provides a good opportunity to diminish the responsibility of each aid 
agency operating in a country. The more aid agencies operating in a country, the 
more difficult it becomes to address the responsibility of any particular one 
among them. Aid failure becomes someone else’s fault.  
Another idea for aid privatization relies on the ability of private firms to 
develop aid programs as a part of their commercial programs. For example, in 
order to get a new market, a soap producer may launch an educational campaign 
on the risks posed by dirty hands. There were such examples on the Indian sub-
continent and elsewhere. Such moves may be more successful compared to clas-
sical aid programs. However, potential fields for such programs are relatively 
rare, and this type of aid is just hardly separable from the usual commercial ac-
tivity.  
Another proposal to improve the efficiency of foreign aid is conditional 
delivery. Aid will resemble a kind of prize – countries conducting more reforms 
will get more aid, while countries resistant to reform will get no aid at all.
35 This 
proposal leaves the donor untouched and assumes that the improvement may 
result from a change in the recipient’s motivation. This is the basic tenet of the 
U.S. project called Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a new scheme of 
foreign aid to be introduced step-by-step during the forthcoming years. This 
proposal initially sounds better, but upon further consideration it shows no im-
provement.  The MCA will not touch the structure of incentives on the donors’ 
side, which is the main problem of aid as it exists now. It will ask for a change in 
recipients’ attitudes, which is a minor problem now, and what will not bring 
about any significant improvements. Even now, foreign aid is a kind of prize, 
and the only difference to the proposal consists in the fact that it is now distrib-
uted unselectively. If the number of reformers among recipients up to now was 
low, there will be no profound change in their attitude in the future. The only 
                                                 
34 Competition may exist among different development donors operating in a recipient country.  
35 The measured indicators would be governance, economic liberties, democracy and women’s 
rights, as they are estimated by the World Bank, Heritage Foundation and Freedom House.  Miroslav Prokopijević 
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important consequence of the MCA proposal will be that a significant number of 
recipients are going to be cut off from aid. Some rulers will intentionally prevent 
reforms in their countries in order to prevent inflow of aid that creates opportuni-
ties for foreign interference into domestic affairs. Despite being in dire need, 
some populations will not be eligible for foreign aid. Others may be eligible 
despite being in much better position. This will question the main official ration-
ale of foreign aid. Instead of being distributed proportionally to the suffering and 
needy, it will become a subsidy to friendly and cooperative regimes.  
This exclusion of non-cooperative regimes will happen only if other do-
nors follow the U.S. case. With no change in the attitude among other donors, 
recipient countries will not be stricken to a degree that they will feel a differ-
ence.
36 The MCA will affect probably more the U.S. interests in a number of 
countries rather than inducing a change among potential recipients.   
Analogous to the MCA, the UN has launched the program for Africa 
called the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG). It is based on sharp in-
crease of donors’ contributions for 170% compared to now, i.e. on their rise to 
0.7% of donors’ GDPs. The MDG recommends eight umbrella goals, 54 indica-
tors of poverty and 449 separate aid operations to be achieved in Africa by 2015. 
The MDG’s main strategist is moderate when he states that the “… goal is to end 
extreme poverty, not to end all poverty”.
37 This is another retreat in development 
philosophy, after it was denominated in 1980s from promoting development to 
alleviating poverty. It is not clear why the budget now should be larger if the 
general objective is reduced.  
Similar to central planners, Sachs just declares good intentions and never 
asks how they are going to be achieved. He never poses the question what are 
the incentives for people to get things done. He just deals with administrative, 
technical and bureaucratic procedures of providing aid. It is puzzling how the 
MDG will inspire a change in foreign aid implementation if even its language 
more closely resembles the press releases of the Soviet committees rather than 
an inspiring tone inspiring spurring on change in the field. This is visible in the 
terminology used by its main author, Jeffrey Sachs:
38  
“… a needs assessment is a key input to … a policy plan… The 
second stage of the planning process will be for each country to 
develop a long-term (10-12 year) framework for action for 
achieving the MDGs…This MDG framework should include a 
policy and public sector management framework to scale up 
public spending and services, as well as a … financing strategy 
to underpin the plan. The third stage of the planning process will 
be for each country to construct its median term (3-5 year) pov-
                                                 
36 Cutting aid is far too week to accomplish some results, and the track record of on-again-off-
again is miserable.  
37 Sachs 2005, 289.  
38 Sachs 2005, 285.  Why Foreign Aid Fails 
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erty reduction strategy (PRS) based on the long-term MDG 
plan. The PRS (poverty reduction strategy) is a move detailed, 
operational document, and should be attached to a Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)”.  
Even the communist planners did not frequently use words like 
planning, framework or strategy as Sachs does. Following that habit, 
the handbook for the MDG uses the word strategy nine times in the 
text and six times in the figure, just as on the first page of its introduc-
tion. Based on recycled ideas that planners used for several decades, 
the MDG program may be considered miscarried before its birth, and 
even more harmful if it is born.  
In conclusion, foreign aid is not just ineffective because it has the same 
structure of incentives like central planning. Instead of inspiring development 
and alleviating poverty, as it was repeatedly pointed out, foreign aid helps to 
preserve the poor state of affairs and entrenches power in those responsible for 
the poor conditions. It is also damaging for preserving poverty, strengthening the 
state and stimulating corruption. Proposals to change aid either via its privatiza-
tion or by making it conditional stop short of changing the structure of incen-
tives. Despite being ineffective, aid will probably continue to exist but be fol-
lowed with less enthusiasm about its effectiveness. Instead of helping those in 
trouble, it erodes their position while serving some other interests.  
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Zašto je strana pomoć neuspešna 
 
Rezime: Osnovna teza ovog rada glasi da je strana razvojna pomoć neuspešna zato što 
po strukturi podsticaja liči na centralno planiranje. Pomoć nije samo neefikasna, već i 
štetna. Suprotno poslovnim firmama koje su plaćene od onih kojima one služe (mušteri-
je), agencije za pomoć plaćaju poreske platiše razvijenih zemalja, a ne oni kojima one 
pomažu (služe). Ova obrnuta struktura podsticaja prekida tok koji stvara pritisak, kakav 
postoji na komercijalnom tržištu, a koji onemogućava da neuspešni opstanu na tržištu. 
Ona takođe stvara veće praznine u odnosu prinicipal-agent i to na svakoj od više tačaka 
u tom odnosu (političari-agencije za pomoć, agencije-lokalni partneri, lokalni partneri-
stanovništvo kome se pruža pomoć). Obrnuta struktura podsticaja i praznine u odnosu 
prinicipal-agent dodatno povećavaju nivo korupcije, moralnog hazarda i negativne sele-
kcije. Umesto da unapređuje razvoj, strana razvojna pomoć produžava život loših usta-
nova i loše vlasti. Predlozi za reformu strane razvojne pomoći – kao što su privatizacija 
ili uslovljavanje pomoći – ne menjaju postojeću strukturu podsticaja pri davanju pomoći, Why Foreign Aid Fails 
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tako da eventualne reforme samo delimično mogu da poboljšaju efikasnost strane pomo-
ći. Veće poboljšanje nije moguće. Usled toga će strana pomoć i dalje predstavljati rasi-
panje resursa, koje možda služi nekoj svrsi, ali ne i onim stvarima koje se zvanično de-
klarišu kao svrha pomoći, kao što su razvoj nerazvijenih zemalja, smanjivanje siromaš-
tva ili ublažavanje patnji.  
 
Ključne reči: Strana razvojna pomoć, Planiranje, Struktura podsticaja, Neefikasnost 
pomoći, Reforma strane pomoći.  
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